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“Danger Is My Business”: The Right to 
Manufacture Unsafe Products 
Richard C. Ausness 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Danger Is My Business is the title of a book published in 
1938 by Colonel John D. Craig, a twentieth-century explorer, 
adventurer, and military figure.1  However, this phrase can also 
be applied to the activities of companies that manufacture 
dangerous or unsafe products.  As judges2 and commentators3 
have observed, products liability law is supposed to encourage 
manufacturers to produce safe products by subjecting them to 
liability when their products fall below an acceptable level of 
safety.  Nevertheless, products liability law sometimes operates 
to discourage the production of safe products by shielding 
manufacturers from liability when they place unsafe products on 
the market. 
This is not necessarily a bad policy.  While no one would 
dispute that safety is a desirable objective, it may not always be 
an absolute priority.  Rather, in some cases, other societal 
interests such as personal autonomy, consumer choice, product 
cost, and performance may trump legitimate safety goals.  This is 
reflected in some of the doctrines and defenses that have evolved 
to protect the producers of unsafe products against tort liability.  
Some of these doctrines, such as those determining liability for 
the producers of optional safety equipment, inherently dangerous 
products, products with obvious hazards, and prescription drugs 
 
       Everett H. Metcalf Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research, 
University of Kentucky; B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968 University of Florida; L.L.M. 1973 Yale 
University.  
1.  See JOHN D. CRAIG, DANGER IS MY BUSINESS (1938). 
2.  See Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 425 (1st Cir. 1988) (Selya, J., 
dissenting); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, 
J., concurring); Barrett v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 304, 314 n.7 (Ct. App. 1990); 
Bewers v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 459 N.Y.S.2d 666, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1982), rev’d, 472 
N.Y.S.2d 637 (App. Div. 1984), aff’d, 474 N.E.2d 247 (N.Y. 1984). 
3.  See Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort 
Concepts Reveal About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 259, 322 (2008). 
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and medical devices, are part of the law of products liability.  
Other doctrines, such as the regulatory compliance defense and 
the contract specification defense, are aspects of the broader law 
of torts.  Finally, a few of these doctrines, such as federal 
preemption and the government contractor defense, are rooted in 
principles of federal supremacy. 
Part II of this article begins with an examination of the 
relationship between defectiveness and safety.  It observes that 
liability is based on the sale of a “defective” product rather than 
on the sale of an unsafe one.4  In other words, the fact that a 
product is not particularly safe does not necessarily mean that it 
is defective.   
Part III identifies a number of doctrines and defenses that 
potentially shield manufacturers of unsafe products from liability.  
These include federal preemption, the regulatory compliance 
defense, the contract specification defense, and the government 
contractor defense.  Part III also observes that current products 
liability law often allows manufacturers to offer safety equipment 
on an optional basis, thereby enabling consumers to purchase 
products that may not be optimally safe.  Likewise, manufacturers 
of inherently dangerous products, such as cigarettes, alcoholic 
beverages, and fast food, are generally immune from liability as 
long as they warn about product risks that might not be matters of 
common knowledge.  Furthermore, under the obvious hazard 
rule, the duty to warn does not extend to hazards that should be 
known to the average consumer.  In addition, the Products 
Liability Restatement, along with most courts, has declined to 
impose strict liability on the sellers of used products.  Finally, 
certain potentially dangerous products, such as prescription 
drugs, vaccines, and medical devices, receive special treatment in 
products liability law because of their high social value. 
Part IV examines a number of societal interests that may 
sometimes prevail over safety goals.  Personal autonomy and 
consumer choice are two closely related interests.  The principle 
of personal autonomy respects the right of individuals to engage 
 
4.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998) (“One 
engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes 
a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the 
defect.”).  
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in risky activities and to purchase dangerous products.5  In 
addition, public policy supports the proposition that consumers 
should have access to a wide range of options when they purchase 
products, including ones that are cheaper, but less safe.6  Product 
cost and performance are also important considerations that must 
be balanced against product safety.  Additional safety features 
often increase product cost and, consequently, may price some 
consumers out of the market.  In addition, as anyone who has 
struggled with child-proof caps knows, safety features sometimes 
adversely affect convenience and product performance.7  Safety 
must sometimes be compromised in order to protect 
governmental interests such as military procurement or agency 
decision-making.  Finally, sub-optimal safety is sometimes 
tolerated in order to protect sellers from liability, as was the case 
when airbags were phased in gradually instead of being required 
all at once. 
II.  HOW SAFE DOES A PRODUCT HAVE TO BE? 
A. Is Product Safety Really “Job One?” 
Undoubtedly, safety is a popular and important societal goal.  
For example, the term “safety” appears prominently in the names 
of federal agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission and the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.  In addition, Congress has placed the words 
“safe” or “safety” in the titles of various pieces of federal 
legislation.  These include the Safe Drinking Water Act,8 the 
Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003,9 the Consumer 
Product Safety Improvement Act,10 the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970,11 the Virginia Graeme Baker Pool and Spa 
 
5.  See Peter L. Berger, Furtive Smokers—and What They Tell Us About America, 
COMMENTARY, June 1994, at 21, 26 (“[A] strong tradition of individual autonomy has 
existed in America . . . .”).  
6.  See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and 
Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1283-84 (1980). 
7.  See J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast 
Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1154 (1996). 
8.  Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2012). 
9.  Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-36 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
10.  Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2089 (2012). 
11.  Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012). 
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Safety Act,12 the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 
1994,13 the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act,14 and the 
Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 
2011,15 just to name a few. 
Consequently, one would expect product manufacturers to 
embrace the idea of safety as well, and indeed they have.  For 
years, product sellers have gone to great lengths to assure the 
public of the safety and reliability of their products.  Some have 
even included the words  “safe” or “safety” as part of a product’s 
name,16 or even as part of the company’s name,17 to suggest that 
these products are benign and pose no threat to life or limb.  
Unfortunately, product manufacturers do not always practice 
what they preach.18  Despite all this talk of safety, many products 
currently on the market are not particularly safe, and some are 
downright dangerous.  Nevertheless, manufacturers continue to 
produce and sell these dangerous products with impunity. 
B. What Do We Mean by “Safety”? 
The term safety has a number of different meanings.  For 
example, the dictionary defines safety as “the condition of being 
safe from undergoing or causing hurt, injury, or loss.”19  
However, other definitions of safety may be more appropriate to 
products liability law.  One such definition focuses on 
technological feasibility.  To satisfy a feasibility standard, 
manufacturers must produce products that are as safe as they 
 
12.  Virginia Graeme Baker Pool and Spa Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8001–8007 (2012). 
13.  Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-440 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
14.  FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353 (codified as amended 
at 7 U.S.C. § 7625, 42 U.S.C. § 280g-16, and in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
15.  Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, 49 U.S.C. §§ 
60138-60140 (2012). 
16.  See, e.g., Maize v. Atl. Ref. Co., 41 A.2d 850, 851 (Pa. 1945) (noting cleaning 
fluid named “Safety-Kleen” produced deadly tetrachloride fumes). 
17.  See, e.g., GARDEN SAFE PRODUCTS, http://www.gardensafe.com (last visited Oct. 
3, 2014); SAFE HOME PRODUCTS, http://www.safehomeproducts.com (last visited Oct. 3, 
2014); SAFETY-KLEEN, http://www.safety-kleen.com (last visited Oct. 3, 2014); 
SKATE SAFE PRODUCTS, http://www.skatesafeproducts.com (last visited Oct. 3, 2014). 
18.  See, e.g., Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409, 412 (Wash. 1932) (holding 
manufacturer’s claim that the glass in its windshield was “so made that it will not fly or 
shatter under the hardest impact” was false and constituted a breach of express warranty).  
19.  See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1036 (1983). 
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could be in light of current technology.20  Some federal statutes 
also mandate safety levels based on a feasibility standard.21  
Although this standard is commonly embodied in statutory safety 
standards, only a few state courts have endorsed it for purposes of 
products liability.22  A more popular standard is optimal safety.  
This efficiency-based standard, discussed in more detail below, 
requires manufacturers to make cost-effective investments in 
product safety.  It should be noted that the level of safety 
necessary to satisfy an optimality standard may be less than the 
level of safety required by the feasibility standard since a safety 
feature that is feasible may not necessarily be cost-effective.  
Finally, a level of safety may be legally sufficient even though it 
is less than optimal.  These sorts of sub-optimally safe products 
are the principal focus of this article. 
C. Safety and Tort Liability 
The relationship between product safety, however defined, 
and products liability has always been somewhat obscure.  For 
example, when the Restatement (Second) of Torts was first 
promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1965, it imposed 
strict liability in tort on the sellers of “defective” and 
“unreasonably dangerous” products.23  However, comments 
suggested that these terms were the same, or nearly the same, by 
defining both as products that were more dangerous than an 
ordinary consumer would expect them to be.24  This “consumer 
expectation” test was derived from warranty law and seemed to 
 
20.  Cf. Robinson v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 500 F.3d 691, 696 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(“While a manufacturer has a duty to design a product that is reasonably safe for its 
foreseeable use, it is not required to design the ‘best possible product,’ and ‘proof that 
technology existed, which if implemented could feasibly have avoided a dangerous 
condition, does not alone establish a defect.’” (quoting Sexton ex rel Sexton v. Bell Helmets, 
Inc., 926 F.2d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 1991))). 
21.  See Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That 
Safety Matters More Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 118 (2001) (discussing 
Occupational Health and Safety Act safety standards). 
22.  See, e.g., Gosewisch v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 365, 370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1985), vacated in part, 737 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1987); Indianapolis Athletic Club v. Alco 
Standard Corp., 709 N.E.2d 1070, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Falada v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 
642 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Iowa 2002); AC&S, Inc. v. Asner, 686 A.2d 250, 254 (Md. 1996); 
Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Soc. Club, 390 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); 
Johnson v. Salem Corp., 477 A.2d 1246, 1251-52 (N.J. 1984); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 
683 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wash. 1984). 
23.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
24.  See id. § 402A cmts. g, i. 
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indicate that liability should be based on deception of consumers 
rather than upon a manufacturer’s failure to meet a particular 
standard of product safety.25  Furthermore, by imposing liability 
only upon manufacturers whose products were “unreasonably 
dangerous,” the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
seemed to imply that manufacturers and others who produced or 
sold reasonably dangerous products would not be subject to tort 
liability. 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that liability under 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts was not based on whether a 
product was safe or unsafe in any sort of absolute sense.  Instead, 
liability depended upon whether a product was reasonably safe.  
But what does reasonably safe mean in this context?  One 
possibility is that it is equivalent to technological feasibility, at 
least in design defect cases.  Under this definition, in order to 
avoid liability, a manufacturer would have to make a product as 
safe as current technology permits.  Although some “state-of-the-
art” cases seemed to have taken this position,26 reasonable safety 
eventually became identified more with optimality than with 
feasibility. 
Influenced by law and economics theorists, courts and legal 
scholars in the 1980s began to view product safety in resource-
allocation terms and concluded that manufacturers should spend 
money on risk-reduction measures only up to the point where the 
marginal cost of achieving further risk reduction would equal or 
exceed the marginal benefits of such reduction.27  Imposing 
liability on the party in the best position to make this 
 
25.  The concept of an unreasonably dangerous product, as defined by the consumer 
expectation test, was replaced by the deviation-from-the-norm test in manufacturing defect 
cases.  See, e.g., McKenzie v. S K Hand Tool Corp., 650 N.E.2d 612, 615-20 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1995).  Under this approach, a product is considered to be defective if it deviates from the 
manufacturer’s intended design.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 2(a) (1998).  Of course, there is no guarantee that the design in question will 
not be unreasonably dangerous, but that question will not arise in a manufacturing defect 
case. 
26.  See, e.g., Indianapolis Athletic Club, 709 N.E.2d at 1074; AC&S, Inc., 686 A.2d 
at 254; O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305 (N.J. 1983). 
27.  See James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The 
Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 768 (1983); David 
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the 
Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 865 (1984). 
2014] DANGER IS MY BUSINESS 833 
determination would ensure that an “efficient” or “optimal” level 
of product safety would be achieved.28 
For the most part, this approach has been retained by the 
drafters of the Products Liability Restatement.  For example, 
section 2(b) declares that a product “is defective in design when 
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have 
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design.”29  In addition, comment a expressly adopts 
optimal safety as a goal by pointing out that in subsections (b) and 
(c), which deal with design defect and failure-to-warn claims, 
respectively, “[t]he emphasis is on creating incentives for 
manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and 
marketing products.”30  The comment continues, “[s]ociety does 
not benefit from products that are excessively safe . . . any more 
than it benefits from products that are too risky.”31  Rather, 
“[s]ociety benefits most when the right, or optimal, amount of 
product safety is achieved.”32 
All of this suggests the “reasonable alternative design” or the 
“reasonable instructions or warnings” are designs or warnings 
that are optimal, or sufficient, to achieve a marginal level of 
accident cost reduction that exceeds their marginal cost.  This 
means that manufacturers need not make their products as safe as 
current technology permits; instead, they are merely required to 
spend money on product safety so long as the marginal cost of 
additional safety measures is less than the expected reduction of 
product-related accident costs.33 
Nevertheless, having identified an optimal level of product 
safety as the standard for avoiding tort liability, the drafters of the 
Products Liability Restatement seem to have retreated from this 
position.  Comment f to section 2, which identifies various factors 
relevant to determining whether an alternative design is 
reasonable, mentions a number of factors unrelated to safety.  
 
28.  See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case 
for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1176 n.42 (1998) 
(“‘[E]fficiently safe products,’ [are] products for which manufacturers have made all cost-
justified investments in safety. ‘Inefficiently unsafe products’ are those for which not all such 
investments have been made.”). 
29.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998). 
30.  Id. § 2 cmt. a.  
31.  Id.  
32.  Id. 
33.  See Henderson, supra note 27, at 768. 
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These include the likely effects of the alternative design on 
product maintenance, repair, and aesthetics, as well as the range 
of consumer choice among products.34  In theory, these 
considerations could trump safety concerns and allow a less safe 
design to pass muster, even if a safer design was both feasible and 
cost effective. 
More importantly, the Products Liability Restatement also 
retains a number of doctrines that potentially allow manufacturers 
to escape tort liability despite the fact that their products are not 
optimally safe.  These include provisions for optional safety 
equipment,35 protection for inherently dangerous products,36 and 
reduced liability for manufacturers and sellers of prescription 
drugs and medical devices.37  In addition, a number of other 
common-law doctrines and defenses, not expressly mentioned in 
the Products Liability Restatement, also allow for the production 
and sale of products that are less than optimally safe. 
III.  DOCTRINES AND DEFENSES ALLOWING FOR 
SUB-OPTIMAL SAFETY 
Manufacturers may invoke a number of specific doctrines 
and defenses to escape liability for injuries to consumers caused 
by products with sub-optimal levels of safety.  These doctrines 
involve such concepts as federal preemption, compliance with 
state-of-the-art, optional safety equipment, and obvious hazards.  
In addition, special rules applicable to inherently dangerous 
products and prescription drugs arguably permit manufacturers to 
produce and sell products that are not optimally safe. 
A. Federal Preemption 
Although the states are considered to be sovereign entities 
under the United States Constitution,38 Congress has the authority 
to preempt state law in the exercise of its constitutional powers 
when it chooses to do so.39  This power to preempt state law 
derives from the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
 
34.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1998). 
35.  See id. § 2 cmt. f, illus. 10. 
36.  See id. § 2 cmt. d. 
37.  Id. § 6. 
38.  See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). 
39.  See id. at 460. 
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Constitution.40  The federal power to preempt not only applies to 
state statutes;41 it extends to local ordinances as well.42  
Furthermore, in recent decades, product manufacturers have 
successfully invoked principles of federal preemption in order to 
negate the effect of state products liability doctrines.43 
Courts44 and commentators45 usually distinguish between 
express and implied preemption.  Express preemption occurs 
when a federal statute specifically excludes state regulation in a 
particular area.46  A number of federal statutes contain express 
preemption provisions.47  In addition, federal agencies, when 
acting within the scope of their delegated authority, may 
expressly preempt state law by regulation.48  Furthermore, 
Congress may impliedly preempt state law.  One form of implied 
preemption occurs when a state attempts to regulate in an area 
that involves a dominant federal interest such as foreign affairs,49 
or when a federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive that it 
 
40.  See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 63 (1941); see also U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of 
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”).  
41.  See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 99 (1992); 
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); Mich. Canners & Freezers 
Ass’n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984). 
42.  See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 
(1973). 
43.  See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co. Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000). 
44.  See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); Hillsborough Cnty. v. 
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985). 
45.  See Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of Federal Preemption: Reformulating the 
Black Letter Rules, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 25, 25 (2005); David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of 
Products Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV. 411, 414 (2003). 
46.  See Morales v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992); Shaw v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 106-08 (1983); Ry. Employes’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 
232 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1947). 
47.  See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (2012) (preempting certain state motor vehicle 
standards). 
48.  See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984) (granting the 
Federal Communications Commission broad authority to regulate cable communications 
systems); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1982) (preempting 
state restrictions on due-on-sale clauses in loan agreements); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 
667-68 (1962) (holding a savings bond right of survivorship is enforceable regardless of state 
law); Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 544-45 (1958) (ruling 
federal policy governing shipping rates for common carriers expressly preempted conflicting 
state policy). 
49.  See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941). 
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occupies the field and leaves no room for state regulation.50  
Another form of preemption, known as conflict preemption, 
occurs either when it is impossible to comply with conflicting 
state and federal laws,51 or when state law stands as an obstacle 
to the achievement of federal regulatory objectives.52 
Legal scholars agree that preemption analysis requires a 
court to ascertain congressional intent.53  However, this is easier 
said than done.  When a federal statute contains an express 
preemption provision, it is clear that Congress intended to 
preempt state law to some extent, and the court’s job is to 
determine the scope of the statute’s preemptive language.54  
Determining congressional intent is more difficult in implied 
preemption situations where there is no specific preemptive 
language to examine.  Thus, the court must examine the statute’s 
regulatory structure and purpose to determine whether Congress 
intended for the federal regulatory scheme to co-exist with state 
regulatory provisions.55 
If state law requires manufacturers to achieve an optimal 
level of safety and federal law allows them to get away with a 
lower, sub-optimal level of safety, the doctrine of federal 
preemption, if applicable, will ensure that the lower level of safety 
prevails.  One might ask why Congress would permit, or even 
mandate, the manufacture of products that were not optimally 
safe.  In most cases, the answer is that Congress has subordinated 
product safety to the achievement of a more important federal 
objective. 
This conflict between product safety and other congressional 
objectives is nicely illustrated by Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 
Inc.56  In Cipollone, the personal representative of a deceased 
 
50.  See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988). 
51.  See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 (2011); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 137 (1913). 
52.  See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1987); Mich. Canners & 
Freezers Ass’n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984); Ark. La. Gas 
Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 584 (1981). 
53.  See Jonathan V. O’Steen & Van O’Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the 
Argument Against Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting from Defective 
Drugs, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 70 (2006); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability 
Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 455 (2008). 
54.  See Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. 
L. REV. 967, 970 (2002). 
55.  See Mary J. Davis, On Restating Products Liability Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. 
REV. 759, 761-62 (2009). 
56.  505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
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smoker brought suit against a tobacco company, claiming that its 
products caused her death from lung cancer.57  The plaintiff 
alleged, inter alia, that the warnings on cigarette labels did not 
adequately inform consumers about the health risks of smoking.58  
However, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the 
express provisions of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act of 1969, but not its predecessor enacted in 1965, 
barred tort claims against tobacco companies based on their 
failure to provide stronger warnings about the health risks of 
smoking.59 
Given the knowledge at the time about the health risks of 
smoking, particularly the risk of lung cancer, the warnings 
mandated by the federal statutes were manifestly inadequate.60  
Therefore, preempting failure-to-warn claims immunized 
cigarette companies from liability and allowed them to 
manufacture products with sub-optimal health warnings. Why 
would Congress allow cigarette companies to market such 
products?  As the Court observed, Congress had objectives, other 
than protecting public health, in mind when it enacted the 
cigarette labeling legislation.61  To be sure, one objective was to 
warn the public about the health risks of smoking.62  However, 
another objective was to “protect[] the national economy from the 
burden imposed by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette 
labeling and advertising regulations.”63  This goal of uniformity 
was presumably intended to protect the economic interests of the 
tobacco industry against stricter state regulation.  Ostensibly, 
these same considerations motivated Congress to enact a revised 
cigarette labeling law when the original Act expired in 1969. 
 
57.  Id. at 508.  The smoker and her husband originally brought the action, and it was 
continued after their deaths by their son on behalf of both estates.  Id. at 509. 
58.  Id. at 508. 
59.  Id. at 530-31.  However, the Court held that the 1969 Act did not preempt claims 
based on breach of express warranty, misrepresentation, or conspiracy.  Id. at 531.  Nor were 
any claims preempted based on the defendant’s failure to provide any health warnings prior 
to 1965.  Id. at 518-20. 
60.  See Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy, 
and Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897, 908-09 (1988); Lars 
Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the “Right to Know” from the “Need to 
Know” About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 304 (1994). 
61.  See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 514. 
62.  Id. (stating statute sought to “adequately inform[] the public that cigarette smoking 
may be hazardous to health”).  
63.  Id. 
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Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.64 also illustrates the 
tension between safety and non-safety objectives.  The plaintiff 
in Geier was injured when her 1987 Honda Accord struck a tree.65  
She brought suit against the manufacturer, alleging that the 
vehicle was defectively designed because it was not equipped 
with an airbag on the driver’s side.66  In response, the 
manufacturer contended that the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act67 and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 
208 (“FMVSS 208”), promulgated by the Department of 
Transportation under the authority of the Act, preempted the 
plaintiff’s “no airbag” claim.68  The manufacturer maintained that 
the plaintiff’s automobile complied with the requirements of 
FMVSS 208, which did not require it to install airbags.69 
Although the federal statute contained an express-
preemption provision, it did not specifically apply to state-law tort 
claims.70  In addition, it contained a savings clause that appeared 
to preserve common-law remedies.71  Consequently, the Court 
concluded that it should interpret the preemption provision 
narrowly72 and ruled that the Act did not expressly preempt the 
plaintiff’s tort claim against the manufacturer.73  Having rejected 
the defendant’s express-preemption argument, the Court then 
considered the argument that the plaintiff’s claim was impliedly 
preempted on conflict grounds.74  Addressing this issue, the Court 
declared that FMVSS 208 “deliberately sought a gradual phase-
in of passive restraints” in annual increments over a three-year 
period.75  This phase-in process was supposed to allow more time 
for manufacturers to improve airbag technology or to develop 
other passive restraint systems.76  In the Court’s view, the 
plaintiff’s lawsuit was predicated on the notion that the defendant 
 
64.  529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
65.  Id. at 865. 
66.  Id. 
67.  See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381–
1431 (1988) (repealed 1994).  The Act was later recodified.  See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30183 
(2012). 
68.  Geier, 529 U.S. at 865-66. 
69.  Id. at 865. 
70.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (repealed 1994). 
71.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (repealed 1994). 
72.  Geier, 529 U.S. at 868. 
73.  Id. at 867-68.  
74.  Id. at 869. 
75.  Id. at 879. 
76.  Id. 
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had a duty to equip all of its 1987 vehicles with airbags.77  
However, the Court concluded that holding the defendant liable 
on this basis “would have stood as an obstacle to the gradual 
passive restraint phase-in that the federal regulation deliberately 
imposed.”78 
In two recent cases, the Court held that certain provisions of 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act79 relating to the 
licensing of generic drugs impliedly preempted common-law 
claims.80  The first, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,81 involved the 
generic drug metoclopramide, which is commonly used to treat 
certain digestive tract problems.82  The FDA approved the drug in 
1980 under the brand name Reglan, and the other manufacturers 
began generic production five years later.83  However, as early as 
1985, the FDA and the drug manufacturers became aware that 
long-term use of metoclopramide could cause tardive dyskinesia, 
a severe neurological disorder.84 
The plaintiffs in Mensing developed tardive dyskinesia after 
taking a generic version of metoclopramide for several years.85  
They alleged that warnings provided by the manufacturers of 
metoclopramide failed to adequately warn about the danger of 
contracting tardive dyskinesia from long-term use of the drug.86  
In response, the defendant manufacturers argued that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by federal law.87 
The defendants’ preemption claim relied on the provisions 
of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, which governed FDA 
licensing of generic drugs.88  The Act allowed drug manufacturers 
to secure approval of generic drugs simply by showing that their 
product was equivalent to a “listed” drug that had already been 
 
77.  Geier, 529 U.S. at 881. 
78.  Id.  
         79.  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301–399f (2012).  
       80. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not contain a generally applicable 
express preemption provision.  See Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: 
Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (2007). 
81.  131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
82.  Id. at 2572. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Id.  
85.  Id. at 2573. 
86.  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2573.  
87.  Id. 
88.  See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).  
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approved by the FDA.89  The Court stated this meant that the 
generic drug’s chemical ingredients and labeling had to be 
identical to that of the listed drug.90  This requirement sought to 
enable manufacturers to inexpensively market generic drugs by 
exempting them from the costly process of conducting duplicative 
clinical trials or other drug testing before seeking FDA 
approval.91 
The defendants and the FDA argued that generic drug 
manufacturers were not permitted to unilaterally strengthen the 
warnings that had been approved by the FDA for the listed drug.92  
The Court agreed and declared that it was impossible for the drug 
companies to comply with both the federal labeling requirements 
and the duty to warn under the state law about newly discovered 
product risks.93  Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ 
failure-to-warn claims were impliedly preempted.94 
The Court reached a similar result in Mutual Pharmaceutical 
Co. v. Bartlett.95  This case involved sulindac, a pain reliever 
approved by the FDA in 1978 under the brand name Clinoril.96  
Unfortunately, sulindac caused serious hypersensitivity skin 
reactions in a small number of users.97  In December 2004, the 
plaintiff took sulindac for shoulder pain and developed toxic 
epidermal necrolysis, which resulted in disfigurement, a number 
of physical disabilities, and near blindness.98  At the time, the 
drug’s label warned that the drug could cause skin reactions or 
death but it did not state that it could cause specific conditions 
such as toxic epidermal necrolysis.99  The plaintiff brought suit 
against a generic manufacturer of sulindac, alleging failure to 
warn and defective design.100  The failure-to-warn claim was 
dismissed on causation grounds, but the plaintiff ultimately 
 
89.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012).  
90.  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(A) (2012) (relevant 
statutory provision).  
91.  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574.  
92.  Id. at 2574-75. 
93.  Id. at 2577-78. 
94.  Id. at 2581. 
95.  133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
96.  Id. at 2471. 
97.  Id. at 2471-72. 
98.  Id. at 2472. 
99.  Id.  However, toxic epidermal necrolysis was listed as a “potential adverse 
reaction” on the drug’s package insert.  Id.  
100.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2472. 
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prevailed on the design defect claim.101  However, on appeal, the 
United States Supreme Court relied on the reasoning of Mensing 
to conclude that the plaintiff’s design defect claim was also 
preempted.102 
The Court observed that under state law, a drug 
manufacturer had a duty to reduce the risk of danger from a drug’s 
side effects either by changing the chemical composition of the 
drug or by altering the drug’s labeling.103  Since it was not 
possible to change sulindac’s chemical composition, the only way 
for the manufacturer to reduce the risk of its side effects was to 
strengthen the drug’s warnings.104  However, because sulindac 
was a generic drug, the manufacturer could not change its labeling 
either.105  Therefore, because it was impossible for the 
manufacturer to comply with both state and federal law 
requirements, state law was necessarily preempted.106 
By preempting the plaintiffs’ tort claims in Mensing and 
Bartlett, the Court enabled the generic drug companies to market 
their products without fear of liability, even though the warnings 
they provided might have been inadequate.  Apparently, the Court 
believed that it was more important to uphold the FDA’s uniform 
labeling policy for generic drugs than it was to encourage 
manufacturers of these products to improve their warnings. 
B. The Contract Specification Defense 
The contract specification defense provides that a 
manufacturer will not be held liable for a design defect when it 
manufactures a product in accordance with the buyer’s plans and 
specifications.107  “As the contract specification defense is 
grounded on the theory of reasonable reliance, the contractor is 
not protected by the defense if he follows specifications that” are 
obviously dangerous.108  However, since the “average contractor 
cannot be expected to possess the expertise needed to examine 
 
101.  Id.  
102.  See id. at 2478-80. 
103.  Id. at 2474. 
104.  Id.  
105.  Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476.  
106.  Id. at 2477. 
107.  See David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Modern Products Liability Law, 70 MO. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (2005). 
108.  See Charles E. Cantu & Randy W. Young, The Government Contractor Defense: 
Breaking the Boyle Barrier, 62 ALB. L. REV. 403, 409 (1998). 
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every design” that is proposed by a potential customer, a 
contractor should ordinarily be able to “rely on a third-party’s 
design specifications without fear of liability.”109 
Although the contract specification doctrine first appeared in 
negligence cases,110 it has also been applied with some frequency 
in products liability cases.111  Moon v. Winger Boss Co.112 is 
illustrative.  In Moon, a worker was injured when his arm became 
 
109.  Id. at 410; see also Burgess v. Colo. Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846-47 (11th Cir. 
1985) (affirming judgment for vaccine manufacturer whose product met detailed 
specifications of government contract); Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. 
Kan. 1983) (denying summary judgment in negligence claim because essential facts to the 
contract specification defense remained controverted); Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co., 
221 F. Supp. 129, 134-35 (N.D. Ind. 1963) (allowing defense where contractor was not 
negligent and merely carried out contract plans and specifications in building chemical 
exhaust apparatus).  
110.  See, e.g., Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373, 374-75 (4th Cir. 1973) 
(affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant crane manufacturer on negligence claim 
where manufacturer followed industrial buyer’s plans and specifications); Moran v. 
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908, 914-17 (3d Cir. 1948) (allowing trier of fact 
to determine liability where manufacturer planned the construction of a structure that later 
caused damage to plaintiff); Md. Cas. Co. v. Indep. Metal Prods. Co., 99 F. Supp. 862, 868 
(D. Neb. 1951) (noting that the defendant did not fail to exercise reasonable care in planning 
a product where a third party determined the product’s design and specifications), aff’d, 203 
F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1953); Wright v. Holland Furnace Co., 243 N.W. 387, 387-88 (Minn. 
1932) (discussing whether a buyer’s reliance on a seller’s “more expert and dependable 
knowledge” of stove construction details shielded the buyer from contributory negligence); 
Szatkowski v. Turner & Harrison, Inc., 584 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171-72 (App. Div. 1992) 
(affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant who complied with purchaser’s design 
specifications). 
111.  See, e.g., Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1974) 
(refusing to hold a manufacturer liable for defective design in products liability case where 
manufacturer was not the designer); Housand v. Bra-Con Indus., 751 F. Supp. 541, 544-45 
(D. Md. 1990) (barring products liability claim where none of the defendants designed or 
engineered the automobile assembly line where plaintiff was injured); Lesnefsky v. Fischer 
& Porter Co., 527 F. Supp. 951, 953-56 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (finding manufacturer of brewery 
cooking device not liable for injury caused by design defect where manufacturer followed 
experienced purchaser’s specifications); Orion Ins. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 502 F. Supp. 
173, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (addressing manufacturer’s defense in products liability case where 
helicopter component part was made to the specifications of a third party); McCabe Powers 
Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592, 593-94 (Ky. 1980) (allowing defense to products 
liability claim where defendant constructed “cherry picker” in accordance with buyer’s 
detailed specifications); Bloemer v. Art Welding Co. Inc., 884 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1994) (holding “a contractor’s compliance with its customer’s plans and specifications is . . 
. a complete defense to strict liability and negligence claims based on defective design”). But 
see, e.g., Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1975) (refusing 
to allow defense in products liability case where manufacturer was not in control of design 
but followed government buyer’s design specifications), vacated, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); 
Hendricks v. Comerio Ercole, 763 F. Supp. 505, 512-13 (D. Kan. 1991) (refusing to shield 
manufacturer from liability for design defects where manufacturer followed buyer’s plans 
and specifications). 
112.  287 N.W.2d 430 (Neb. 1980). 
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entangled in the sprocket and chain of a moving breaking table.113  
The specifications provided by the plaintiff’s employer did not 
provide for protective guards, which left the chain mechanism 
exposed.114  The plaintiff alleged that the machine was defectively 
designed,115 but the court concluded that the manufacturer was 
not liable if it manufactured the product in accordance with the 
employer’s plans and specifications, assuming they were not 
“obviously, patently, or glaringly dangerous.”116 
A Missouri appellate court reached a similar result in 
Bloemer v. Art Welding Co.117  In the case, two employees were 
injured while they were cleaning a three-story-tall cylindrical tank 
known as a “cyclone.”118  The defendant constructed the machine 
according to specifications provided by the plaintiffs’ 
employer.119  The plaintiffs claimed that various design defects 
caused them to be burned by hot water trapped inside the cyclone 
when they attempted to open its access door.120  Affirming the 
lower court’s judgment for the manufacturer, the court applied the 
contract specification doctrine to shield the product manufacturer 
from liability.121 
Although the contract specification defense is based on the 
notion that it is unfair to hold a manufacturer liable for a product’s 
defective design when the manufacturer had no role in designing 
the product,122 by immunizing a manufacturer from liability in all 
but the most egregious cases, the doctrine arguably reduces 
incentives to produce a safe product. 
C. Government Contractor Defense 
The government contractor defense protects a manufacturer 
from liability when its product complies with design 
specifications set forth in a government procurement contract.123  
The defense was originally invoked by public-works contractors 
 
113.  Id. at 431. 
114.  Id. at 431-32. 
115.  Id. at 432. 
116.  Id. at 434. 
117.  884 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). 
118.  Id. at 56-57 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
119.  Id. at 57. 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. at 59. 
122.  See Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1974). 
123.  See Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 553 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d, 
755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1985).  
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to bar negligence claims against them for damage to land and 
other property.124  Later, defense contractors began to rely on this 
defense to defeat claims brought against them by third parties for 
injuries caused by defectively designed products supplied to the 
military.125  Prior to 1988, there was some uncertainty about the 
nature and scope of the government contractor defense.126  
However, these issues were resolved that year by the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Boyle v. United Technologies 
Corp.127 
The decedent in Boyle, a United States Marine Corps pilot, 
drowned when his helicopter crashed into the Atlantic Ocean 
during a training exercise.128  The pilot’s personal representative 
brought suit against Sikorsky, the manufacturer of the aircraft, 
alleging that its emergency escape hatch system was defectively 
designed.129  The plaintiff claimed that the hatch door was 
defective because it was designed to open outward and, therefore, 
could not be opened because of water pressure if the helicopter 
crashed at sea.130  The plaintiff also claimed that when one of the 
control sticks was pulled fully up, it interfered with the pilot’s 
access to the escape hatch.131  A jury awarded damages to the 
plaintiff, but the judgment was reversed on appeal.132  The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was 
barred by what it called the “military contractor defense.”133 
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court 
first considered whether federal law would relieve a government 
 
124.  See, e.g., Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 19 (1940); Green v. 
ICI Am., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1264 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United 
States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965). 
125.  See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 404 (4th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Grumman 
Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1985); Burgess v. Colo. Serum Co., 772 F.2d 
844, 844-45 (11th Cir. 1985); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 558 (5th Cir. 1985); 
Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 598-600 (7th Cir. 1985); Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d. at 353; 
McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983). 
126.  See Richard Ausness, Surrogate Immunity: The Government Contract Defense 
and Products Liability, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 985, 1014 (1986) (“[A] number of issues must still 
be resolved before the specific dimensions of the government contract defense are fully 
revealed.”). 
127.  487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
128.  Id. at 502. 
129.  Id. at 503. 
130.  Id. 
131.  See id. 
132.  See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986). 
133.  Id. at 415. 
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contractor of any state-law duty regarding product design.134  The 
Court determined that procurement decisions by the federal 
government were discretionary functions under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act.135  Further, the Court held that the procurement of 
products and services by the federal government was a unique 
federal interest and, therefore, those who contracted with the 
federal government to supply these goods and services should 
also be exempt from liability.136  Without such protection, when 
state standards and federal product-design requirements differed, 
federal contractors would be forced to choose between complying 
with the requirements of state law or designing their products 
according to the specifications provided by the federal 
government.137  This conflict would adversely affect the 
procurement process because if government contractors were 
subject to liability under state law, they might decline to 
manufacture a product according to the design specified by the 
government, or they might raise the price for such products in 
order to pay prospective design defect claims.138 
Having concluded that federal contractors should receive 
some protection from liability under state tort law, the Court 
adopted the test formulated by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.139  
Under this approach, a court should not impose tort liability for 
design defects in military equipment if: (1) the United States 
approved reasonably precise specifications for the product; (2) the 
equipment in question conformed to these specifications; and (3) 
the military contractor warned procurement officers about any 
product-related risks known to the supplier but not known to 
government officials.140 
Safety may not be the primary concern of designers of 
military hardware.  Often, cost is an important consideration, and, 
therefore, government procurement officers must forego 
expensive safety features in order to stay within budget.  In 
addition, it is sometimes necessary to reject a safer alternative 
 
134.  See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.  
135.  Id. at 511. 
136.  Id. at 504-06. 
137.  See id. at 509. 
138.  Id. at 507. 
139.  Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512; see also Boyle v. United Techs. Corp. 792 F.2d 413, 414 
(4th Cir. 1986) (articulating Fourth Circuit test); McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 
444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983) (articulating Ninth Circuit test). 
140.  See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. 
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because it will adversely affect the performance of the product’s 
military mission.  Sanner v. Ford Motor Co.141 provides a good 
illustration of this trade-off between safety and performance.  In 
Sanner, the plaintiff was injured when a military jeep in which he 
was riding was struck by another vehicle.142  The jeep did not 
overturn, but the plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle because 
it was not equipped with seat belts.143  The plaintiff alleged that 
the jeep was defective because it was manufactured without 
seatbelts or other restraints.144  Although the United States Army 
considered equipping its jeeps with seat belts, it eventually 
rejected the idea because “when used in certain tactical situations 
they could compromise the occupants by deterring immediate 
egress and escape from the vehicle.”145  A New Jersey court ruled 
in favor of the manufacturer, even though the installation of seat 
belts would have made the vehicle much safer in most accident 
situations.146 
The government contractor defense validates the 
government’s decision to accept greater product risk than 
necessary in order to achieve other objectives.  Unfortunately, it 
also shifts the risk of product-related injuries from those who 
design and manufacture dangerous products to those who are 
injured by them. 
D. Optional Safety Equipment 
The legal rules governing optional safety equipment also 
allow manufacturers to design and sell products that are not as 
safe as they could be.  Courts and commentators have offered 
several reasons for allowing manufacturers to provide safety 
equipment to consumers on an optional basis.147  First, as a matter 
of personal autonomy, consumers who have a higher tolerance for 
risk should be able to purchase products with fewer safety 
features if they choose, just as they are allowed to engage in 
 
141.  364 A.2d 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). 
142.  Id. at 43-44. 
143.  Id. at 44. 
144.  Id. at 43-44. 
145.  Id. at 44. 
146.   See Sanner, 364 A.2d at 45. 
147.  See generally Richard C. Ausness, Risky Business: Liability of Product Sellers 
Who Offer Safety Devices as Optional Equipment, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 807 (2011); James 
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Optional Safety Devices: Delegating Product Design 
Responsibility to the Market, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1399 (2013). 
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unavoidably risky activities.  It follows that consumers should 
also be able to purchase cheaper versions of a product in order to 
save money for other purposes.  In addition, some consumers may 
be better risk bearers because they are more intelligent or more 
skilled, or because they have a greater capacity to spread the risk 
of injury through insurance.  Finally, when a product is designed 
for multiple uses, the consumer, rather than the manufacturer, will 
be better able to determine which safety devices are necessary for 
the consumer’s intended use. 
Over the years, courts have applied various approaches to 
decide when a manufacturer should be allowed to offer safety 
equipment to consumers on an optional basis.  A number of early 
cases avoided any direct consideration of the issue and instead 
focused on whether the product was defective as sold.148  Miller 
v. Dvornik149 illustrates this approach. In Miller, the plaintiff was 
injured when his motorcycle was struck by an automobile.150  The 
plaintiff alleged that the motorcycle was defective because it was 
not equipped with safety crash bars.151  The manufacturer 
apparently offered crash bars as an option.152  Affirming the lower 
court’s dismissal of the strict liability claim against the retail 
seller of the motorcycle, the court declared that the mere 
availability of optional safety equipment was not relevant to 
whether the product, as sold, was unreasonably dangerous.153 
However, other courts have recognized that the availability 
of optional safety equipment constitutes a defense in some 
circumstances.  For example, in Rainbow v. Albert Elia Building 
Co.,154 a New York court determined that the purchaser of a 
motorcycle was in the best position to decide whether to purchase 
optional side crash bars.155  The plaintiff, who was injured when 
he struck a parked car, argued that the motorcycle was defectively 
 
148.  See Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 1999); Nettles 
v. Electrolux Motor AB, 784 F.2d 1574, 1578-80 (11th Cir. 1986); Tannenbaum v. Yale 
Materials Handling Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 425, 433 (D. Md. 1999); Beron v. Kramer-Trenton 
Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268, 1270-71 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford, 406 So. 
2d 854, 857 (Ala. 1981); Pigliavento v. Tyler Equip. Corp., 669 N.Y.S.2d 747, 748-49 (App. 
Div. 1998); Coleman v. Cintas Sales Corp., 40 S.W.3d 544, 548-49 (Tex. App. 2001). 
149.  501 N.E.2d 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
150.  Id. at 161-62. 
151.  Id. at 162. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. at 163-64. 
154.  436 N.Y.S.2d 480 (App. Div. 1981), aff’d, 434 N.E.2d 1345 (N.Y. 1982). 
155.  Id. at 483. 
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designed because the manufacturer failed to provide side crash 
bars as standard equipment.156  The court, however, concluded 
that the consumer’s knowledge of the risk was an important factor 
in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous due 
to its lack of optional, as opposed to standard, safety 
equipment.157 
Other courts distinguish between single-purpose and multi-
purpose products, allowing manufacturers to offer safety devices 
as options for multi-purpose products, but not for single- purpose 
products.158  One of the first cases to adopt this approach was 
Turney v. Ford Motor Co.159  In Turney, the plaintiff, who was 
injured after being ejected from a tractor, alleged that the tractor 
was unreasonably dangerous because it was not equipped with a 
“roll-over protection system,” which usually consists of a roll bar 
and seatbelt.160  The court observed that the tractor was multi-
functional and was sold for use in a variety of workplace 
environments, some of which had low clearances not suitable for 
tractors with roll bars.161  Accordingly, the court held that it was 
proper for the lower court to allow the manufacturer to introduce 
evidence of the tractor’s multi-purpose nature as a factor for the 
jury to consider in determining whether it was unreasonably 
dangerous.162 
A Texas court applied the same approach in Sears, Roebuck 
& Co. v. Kunze.163  Therein, the purchaser of a ten-inch radial 
power saw contended that the saw was defectively designed 
because it was not equipped with a lower blade guard.164  The 
manufacturer claimed that because consumers used the saw to 
make many different kinds of cuts, it was difficult to design a 
 
156.  Id. at 481. 
157.  Id. at 482-83. 
158.  See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 624 (Minn. 1984).  This should 
be distinguished from the situation in which a manufacturer is allowed to sell a multi-purpose 
product without any safety devices, thereby shifting the responsibility to the buyer to 
purchase safety devices from another vendor that are appropriate for the product’s intended 
use.  See Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1190 (5th Cir. 1978); 
Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 504 N.E.2d 772, 775-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).  But see 
Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 290 A.2d 281, 284-85 (N.J. 1972).  
159.  418 N.E.2d 1079 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 
160.  Id. at 1082 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
161.  Id. at 1083. 
162.  Id. 
163.  996 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. App. 1999). 
164.  Id. at 421-22. 
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lower blade guard that would protect all users in every case.165  
However, the court was not persuaded by this argument and 
affirmed the lower court’s judgment for the plaintiff.166 
Finally, some courts may opt for the multi-factor analysis 
first articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Scarangella 
v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc.167 and subsequently followed in 
several other cases.168  In Scarangella, a school bus driver was 
struck by another school bus that was backing up.169  The plaintiff 
maintained that the bus was defectively designed because it was 
not equipped with a back-up alarm system.170  The school bus 
manufacturer offered this device as optional equipment, but the 
plaintiff’s employer declined to purchase it.171  Affirming a lower 
court judgment in favor of the defendant, the court declared that 
three factors must be shown to exist before a manufacturer can 
shift responsibility for making safety decisions to a purchaser: (1) 
the buyer is knowledgeable about the product and is aware of 
available safety features; (2) there are some uses for which it is 
not unreasonably dangerous without the optional safety 
equipment; and (3) the buyer can balance the risks and benefits of 
not purchasing the safety device in question, given the buyer’s 
contemplated use of the product.172  The court found that all of 
these factors were present and, therefore, held that the bus was 
not defective.173 
It is obvious that allowing manufacturers to offer safety 
devices as optional equipment may lead to a sub-optimal level of 
product safety for some purchasers.  First, consumers may decline 
to purchase optional safety equipment because they erroneously 
believe that they can safely encounter the risk.  Second, many 
products are purchased by employers or others who will not 
 
165.  Id. at 422. 
166.  Id. at 420. 
167.  717 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1999). 
168.  See, e.g., Passante v. Agway Consumer Prods. Inc., 909 N.E.2d 563, 566-67 
(N.Y. 2009); Campbell v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 822 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (App. Div. 
2006); Beemer v. Deere & Co., 794 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254 (App. Div. 2005); Bova v. Caterpillar, 
Inc., 761 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86-87 (App. Div. 2003); Geddes v. Crown Equip. Corp., 709 
N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (App. Div. 2000). 
169.  Scarangella, 717 N.E.2d at 680. 
170.  Id. at 681. 
171.  Id. at 680. 
172.  Id. at 683. 
173.  Id. at 683-84. 
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actually use them.174  By refusing to purchase optional safety 
equipment, buyers benefit by saving money, but the increased risk 
of injury falls upon employees or other users.175 
E. Inherently Dangerous Products 
Virtually all products are capable of causing harm if they are 
not used properly.176  However, there are products that are 
“inherently hazardous,” even when used properly, “because of 
their inescapable, generic risks.”177  Some of these products are 
dangerous in their natural state, like certain types of 
mushrooms,178 or Dasheen root, which is poisonous in its 
uncooked state.179  Others, such as butter, bacon, cigarettes, 
alcoholic beverages, or hamburgers, come from natural products 
that are processed before being sold to consumers.180  Finally, 
there are manufactured products, such as all-terrain vehicles, 
above-ground swimming pools, and explosives or firearms, 
which also pose a serious risk of injury to users and bystanders.181 
In general, manufacturers are not liable under strict liability 
principles for selling inherently dangerous products to the public 
as long as they provide adequate warnings about latent inherent 
risks.182  The traditional rationale for this lenient treatment was 
that inherently dangerous products, when accompanied by 
appropriate warnings, were not unreasonably dangerous or 
defective.183  This can be traced back to comment i in section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which declared that 
such inherently dangerous products as “[g]ood whiskey,” “[g]ood 
tobacco,” and “[g]ood butter” were not unreasonably dangerous 
 
174.  See James A. Henderson, Jr., The Constitutive Dimensions of Tort: Promoting 
Private Solutions to Risk-Management Problems, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 221, 252 n.169 
(2013). 
175.  See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American 
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1263, 1274-75 (1991).  
176.  David G. Owen, Inherent Product Hazards, 93 KY. L.J. 377, 377 (2004). 
177.  Id. at 378. 
178.  See Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1033 (9th Cir. 1991). 
179.  See Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1054-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). 
180.  See Owen, supra note 176, at 379. 
181.  See id. at 404 (providing firearms as an example of such a manufactured product).  
182.  See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1090 (5th Cir. 1973).  
On the other hand, there is no duty to warn about obvious risks or matters of common 
knowledge.  See Bruner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 
2001); Pemberton v. Am. Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tenn. 1984). 
183.  See Owen, supra note 176, at 383-84. 
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under the Restatement’s ordinary consumer expectation test.184  
The Products Liability Restatement has reiterated this approach.  
For example, comment d to section 2 declares that “[c]ommon 
and widely distributed products such as alcoholic beverages, 
firearms, and above-ground swimming pools may be found to be 
defective only upon proof of the requisite conditions in 
Subsection (a), (b), or (c).”185  The comment further states that in 
the absence of such proof, courts have not imposed liability upon 
the sellers of such products “even if they pose substantial risks of 
harm.”186  According to the Products Liability Restatement, this 
more lenient treatment is justified because legislatures and 
administrative agencies are better equipped to determine whether 
any of these inherently dangerous products should be sold to the 
public.187 
Although most courts have accepted the Restatement’s 
approach, some plaintiffs’ lawyers and legal commentators have 
advocated that the manufacturers of inherently dangerous 
products be held liable to injured consumers even though their 
products are not defective.  One of the more popular liability 
theories is known as product category liability.188  According to 
this concept, manufacturers can be held liable, even in the absence 
of a conventional defect, if the accident costs that they generate 
outweigh the benefits that the public derives from their use or 
 
184.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). 
185.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (1998). 
186.  Id. 
187.  Id. 
188.  See generally Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the 
Center of Products Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. (1995); John L. Diamond, Eliminating the 
“Defect” in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529 (1983); Ellen 
Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative 
Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429 (1994); Franklin E. 
Crawford, Note, Fit for Its Ordinary Purpose? Tobacco, Fast Food, and the Implied 
Warranty of Merchantability, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1165 (2002); Michael J. Toke, Note, 
Categorical Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable Designs: Why the Comment D Caveat 
Should Be Removed from the Restatement (Third), 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (1996). 
Several commentators are critical of the theory.  See generally Richard C. Ausness, Product 
Category Liability: A Critical Analysis, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 423 (1997); Harvey M. Grossman, 
Categorical Liability: Why the Gates Should Be Kept Closed, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 385 (1995); 
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 175. 
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consumption.189  Although a few courts have endorsed product 
category liability,190 most have rejected it.191 
By definition, a specific inherently dangerous product has 
dangerous attributes that cannot be reduced by a safer design or 
by additional warnings.192  Therefore, a manufacturer cannot 
make an inherently dangerous product safer by installing 
additional safety devices.193  Nevertheless, there is another way 
to reduce the costs to society of such a product.  In theory, the 
imposition of tort liability would increase the price of an 
inherently dangerous product and, therefore, reduce 
consumption.194  Less consumption, in turn, would result in fewer 
accident costs associated with the products.195  On the other hand, 
the present approach, which immunizes the manufacturers of 
inherently dangerous products, causes the products to be cheaper, 
increasing consumption and, therefore, increasing product-related 
injuries.196  Thus, from a public-policy perspective, relieving the 
manufacturer of liability for the sale of an inherently dangerous 
product is analogous to relieving it of the duty to install a safety 
device. 
 
189.  See Toke, supra note 188, at 1185.  
190.  See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 114 (La. 1986) 
(discussing asbestos); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143, 1159 (Md. 1985) (discussing 
handguns); O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983) (discussing above-
ground swimming pools). 
191.  See Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing 
cigarettes), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215, reaff’d on remand, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992); Roysdon 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988) (discussing cigarettes); 
Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1986) (discussing 
firearms); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1274 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing firearms); 
Gianitsis v. Am. Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D.N.H. 1988) (discussing cigarettes); 
Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1988) 
(discussing cigarettes), aff’d, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 
F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (discussing cigarettes); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. 
Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987) (discussing firearms), aff’d, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); 
Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing firearms); 
Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845, 849 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1991) (discussing alcoholic beverages).  
192.  Owen, supra note 176, at 380. 
193.  Id.  
194.  See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 175, at 1273. 
195.  James A. Henderson, Jr., Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: 
Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1040 (1980).  
196.  See Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover 
Expenditures for the Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and 
Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81, 104 (1994). 
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F. Products with Obvious Hazards 
At one time, consumers who exposed themselves to obvious 
product-related risks did so at their own peril.197  According to the 
patent danger rule, manufacturers had no duty to eliminate 
obvious hazards by improving the design of their products.198  
However, some courts criticized the patent danger rule as it 
related to design defect claims,199 and it eventually fell out of 
favor.200  Today, the obviousness of the danger is no longer 
conclusive in design defect cases; instead, it serves simply as a 
factor that the jury may take into account in evaluating a product’s 
design.201 
On the other hand, the vast majority of courts have 
concluded that there is no duty to warn consumers about risks that 
are open, obvious, or commonly known.202  Courts have offered 
various justifications for this rule.  In the first place, if a user or 
consumer of a product is already aware of the risk, a warning 
would be redundant and serve no useful purpose.203  In addition, 
when a risk is obvious, it should follow that failure to warn about 
it cannot be a cause-in-fact of any injury that results from 
exposure to the hazard in question.  Finally, requiring 
unnecessary warnings might vitiate the effectiveness of warnings 
about non-obvious hazards.204 
Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Industries205 
provides a good illustration of how the obvious danger rule affects 
a manufacturer’s duty to warn.  In the case, the plaintiffs were 
severely injured when they dove headfirst into a shallow, above-
 
197.  See Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (N.Y. 1950); Bartkewich v. Billinger, 
247 A.2d 603, 605 (Pa. 1968). 
198.  See 2 DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 10.2 (4th ed. 2014) (describing the “patent danger” rule). 
199.  See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 235 (Cal. 1970) (en banc); 
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 576-77 (N.Y. 1976); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, 
Inc., 476 P.2d 713, 718-19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970). 
200.  2 OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 198, § 10.3. 
201.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (1998). 
202.  See, e.g., Abney v. Crosman Corp., 919 So. 2d 289, 296 (Ala. 2005); Johnson v. 
Am. Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 911-12 (Cal. 2008); Greene v. A.P. Prods., Ltd., 717 
N.W.2d 855, 863 (Mich. 2006); Fitzgerald v. Fed. Signal Corp., 883 N.Y.S.2d 67, 67 (App. 
Div. 2009); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. j 
(1998) (noting the rule). 
203.  See First Nat’l Bank & Trust v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 378 F.3d 682, 690 (7th 
Cir. 2004). 
204.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. j (1998). 
205.  491 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1992).  
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ground swimming pool.206  Each plaintiff claimed that the product 
was defective because the manufacturer failed to warn about the 
risk of paralysis from diving into a shallow pool.207  The court 
rejected the claims, declaring that the obvious nature of the 
product’s danger served the same function as a warning and, 
therefore, made an express warning unnecessary.208  
Consequently, the plaintiffs could not complain that the 
manufacturer had failed to warn about this particular danger.209 
Despite this reasoning, the obvious danger rule, as it relates 
to the duty to warn, may lead to a sub-optimal level of safety in 
some cases.  That is because a hazard that is obvious to an 
ordinary consumer may not be obvious to all consumers.  Young 
children and persons with mental disabilities may not be able to 
appreciate risks to the same extent as people of greater experience 
or intelligence.  However, these individuals might respond to a 
warning about such “obvious” risks.  By removing any incentive 
to provide a warning in such cases, the obvious danger rule 
enables a manufacturer to place a product on the market that is 
not optimally safe. 
G. Used Products 
Generally speaking, used products are less safe than new 
ones.  One reason for this is that advances in safety technology 
virtually ensure that older products will not be designed as well 
as newer ones.  In addition, older products will be less safe than 
newer ones because of wear and tear and other forms of 
deterioration.210  The effect of aging and obsolescent design is 
particularly serious in the case of products such as motor vehicles, 
airplanes, farm equipment, and industrial products like punch 
presses, which are dangerous even when they are new.  Given the 
fact that used products are likely to be inherently less safe than 
new products, one might expect courts to encourage accident cost 
avoidance measures by product sellers by subjecting them to strict 
liability.  However, the opposite is true.  Most states have rejected 
 
206.  Id. at 210. 
207.  Id. at 223. 
208.  See id. at 217-219. 
209.  See id. 
210.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8 cmt. b (1998). 
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strict liability and instead have subjected product sellers to a less 
rigorous liability standard such as negligence.211 
Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.212 exemplifies the 
majority approach.  In the case, two children were struck by a six-
year-old motor vehicle while walking home from school.213  One 
child was killed, and the other was severely injured.214  The car 
was a used vehicle purchased a few months earlier from the 
defendant car dealer.215  The plaintiff alleged that the vehicle was 
defective for three reasons: (1) “[a] spring or springs in the left 
front wheel braking system was missing at the time of its sale”; 
(2) “[o]ne of the left rear brake shoes was completely worn out at 
the time of the sale”; and (3) “[a] part of the cylinder braking 
system in the left rear wheel was missing at the time of the 
sale.”216  The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s strict liability 
claims, but an intermediate appellate court reversed.217 
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that strict liability 
is not applicable to the sellers of used products when they are 
outside of the original production and marketing chain.218  The 
court distinguished those who are part of the original marketing 
chain, such as wholesalers and retailers, from used product 
sellers.219  Unlike wholesalers and retailers, the court reasoned 
that the sellers of used products had no ability to exert pressure 
upon manufacturers to increase the safety of their products.220  
Furthermore, the court declared that since the used car dealer in 
this case did not create the risk, imposing strict liability upon the 
dealer would make it an insurer for any risks that arose after the 
 
211.  See, e.g., Harber v. Altec Indus., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 954, 965 (W.D. Mo. 1993), 
aff’d, 5 F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 1993); Keith v. Russell T. Bundy & Assocs., 495 So. 2d 1223, 
1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Grimes v. Axtell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, 403 N.W.2d 781, 
785 (Iowa 1987); Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (Or. 1979).  But see 
Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co., 660 P.2d 1236, 1241 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Turner v. Int’l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62, 70 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1975); Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31, 34 (S.D. 1983); 
Hibbard ex rel Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518, 524 (Wis. 1991). 
212.  329 N.E.2d 785 (Ill. 1975). 
213.  Id. at 786. 
214.  Id. 
215.  Id. 
216.  Id.  
217.  See Peterson v. Lou Backrodt Chevrolet Co., 307 N.E.2d 729, 734-35 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1974), rev’d, 329 N.E.2d 785 (Ill. 1975).  
218.  See Peterson, 329 N.E.2d at 787. 
219.  Id. 
220.  See id. 
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vehicle left the manufacturer’s possession and while it was under 
the control of one or more consumers.221  The court also rejected 
the plaintiff’s contention that it should impose a duty on used car 
dealers to inspect their vehicles for defects and to insure against 
any defects that were not discoverable through a reasonable 
inspection.222 
For the most part, the Products Liability Restatement adopts 
the majority position on this issue.223  The drafters set forth a 
negligence standard as the general liability rule applicable to the 
sale of used products.224  Strict liability is imposed only in cases 
where the seller represents that the product is as safe as a new 
product,225 where the product is remanufactured,226 or where the 
seller has failed to comply with applicable governmental safety 
standards.227 
Assuming that a negligence standard does not provide the 
same safety incentive to merchants that strict liability does, sellers 
of used products will probably devote fewer resources to 
inspections and maintenance under a negligence regime.  This 
may very well create a market for used products that are not 
optimally safe.  As Justice Goldenhersh pointed out in his dissent 
in Peterson, the defects in the motor vehicle’s braking system 
probably could have been discovered upon reasonable 
inspection.228  Presumably, the used car dealer in the case would 
have inspected the vehicle more carefully if he were subject to 
strict liability. 
H. Pharmaceutical Products 
Pharmaceutical products include chemical drugs, biologics, 
and medical devices.  Chemical drugs are chemical compounds 
that affect the human body through chemical means.229  The 
FDA’s regulatory scheme distinguishes between prescription 
 
221.  Id. 
222.  Id. 
223.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8 (1998). 
224.  See id. § 8(a). 
225.  Id. § 8(b). 
226.  Id. § 8(c). 
227.  See id. § 8(d). 
228.  Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ill. 1975) 
(Goldenhersh, J., dissenting). 
229.  See Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-On Biologics, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
363, 367 (2007).  
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drugs and “over-the-counter” products.230  As might be expected, 
prescription drugs are more strictly regulated and may only be 
sold to patients who have obtained a prescription from their 
physician.231  Over-the-counter drugs are considered to be less 
dangerous, but they are still subject to regulation by the FDA.232  
Biologics, such as vaccines and antibiotics, affect the body 
through biological rather than chemical processes.233  They are 
regulated by the FDA in much the same way as prescription 
drugs.234  Medical devices are also subject to regulation by the 
FDA, which distinguishes between three classes of devices based 
on the degree of danger posed to the public.235 
 From the earliest days of modern products liability, special 
liability rules have been applied to pharmaceutical products.  
Various reasons explain this special treatment: (1) the chemical 
composition of drugs cannot be changed to provide greater safety; 
(2) their adverse effects cannot always be discovered prior to 
marketing; (3) they are subject to strict regulation by the FDA; 
(4) they have very high social utility; and (5) medical 
practitioners, not ordinary consumers, decide which drugs their 
patients should take.236 
When the Restatement (Second) of Torts was first 
promulgated, the drafters declared in comment k to section 402A 
that “unavoidably unsafe” products were neither unreasonably 
dangerous nor defective, even though they caused harm, as long 
as their apparent utility outweighed their apparent risks and 
proper warnings were given.237  Although the term “unavoidably 
unsafe” was left undefined, the drafters provided several 
 
230.  See Prescription Drugs and Over-the-Counter (OTC) Drugs: Questions and 
Answers, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Resourcesforyou/consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100101.ht
m (last updated Sept. 3, 2013).  
231.  Id. 
232.  See id.  
233.  See Kyle Barrett, Note, Implementing the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act: Why Legal Principles Justify a Broad Definition of Biosimilarity, 85 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1597, 1600-01 (2012).  
234.  See id. at 1608.  
235.  Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The 
Courts Run Amok, 59 MO. L. REV. 895, 912 (1994). 
236.  See Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the 
Restatement (Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 210-11 (1999) 
(noting these justifications).  
237.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
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examples, all of which involved pharmaceutical products.238  
Most courts and commentators accepted, at least to some degree, 
this concept of limited liability for pharmaceutical products.239  
However, some courts ruled that all prescription drugs were 
entitled to automatic class-wide protection from claims of 
defective design,240 while others were willing to consider whether 
a drug came within the “unavoidably unsafe” description of 
comment k on a case-by-case basis.241  A few jurisdictions 
refused to adopt the approach at all.242  However, over the years, 
courts have characterized a variety of pharmaceutical products as 
“unavoidably unsafe” and have applied comment k’s provisions 
to most types of pharmaceutical products, including chemical 
drugs, antibiotics, vaccines, blood, and medical devices.243  At the 
same time, judges refused to extend the principle articulated in 
comment k to non-medical products such as golf carts or concrete 
mix.244 
In 1998, the drafters of the Products Liability Restatement 
included a provision that specifically addressed the issue of 
liability for the manufacturers of pharmaceutical products.245  
Section 6(d) subjects pharmaceutical manufacturers to liability 
for inadequate warnings only if: (1) reasonable warnings are not 
provided to prescribing physicians or other health care providers 
who are in a position to reduce the risk of harm or (2) the warnings 
 
238.  See id.  
239.  See Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Reasoning 
and Policy Behind Comment K, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1985). 
240.  See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482-83 (Cal. 1988); Grundberg 
v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991). 
241.  See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989); Toner v. 
Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 309 (Idaho 1987); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 
383 (N.J. 1984); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988). 
242.  See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 659 (1st Cir. 1981).  
243.  See, e.g., Plummer v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing 
vaccines); Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing 
prescription drugs); Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1337-1339 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(discussing an intrauterine device); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1230 (4th Cir. 
1984) (discussing a cardiac pacemaker); DeLuryea v. Winthrop Labs., 697 F.2d 222, 229 
(8th Cir. 1983) (discussing prescription drugs); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. 
Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 125-26 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (discussing blood); Feldman, 479 A.2d 
at 383 (discussing antibiotics). 
244.  See Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); 
Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 186 N.W.2d 258, 264 (Wis. 1971). 
245.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998).  The 
Products Liability Restatement treats manufacturing defects for prescription drugs and 
medical devices in the same manner as it treats other products.  See Lars Noah, This Is Your 
Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839, 841 (2009). 
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are not provided to the patient when the manufacturer knows or 
should know that a health-care provider will not be available to 
reduce the risk to the patient.246  Section 6(c) declares that a 
prescription drug or medical device is defectively designed only 
if its foreseeable risks “are sufficiently great in relation to its 
foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care 
providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic 
benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any 
class of patients.”247 
Comment b to section 6 declares that under section 6(c), “a 
drug is defectively designed only when it provides no net benefit 
to any class of patients.”248  Comment b goes on to state that 
defective design will be found when “the drug or device ha[s] so 
little merit compared with its risks that reasonable health-care 
providers, possessing knowledge of risks that were known or 
reasonably should have been known, would not have prescribed 
the drug or device for any class of patients.”249  The comment 
continues, “a prescription drug or medical device that has 
usefulness to any class of patients is not defective in design even 
if it is harmful to other patients.”250 
Needless to say, this approach has proved to be very 
controversial.251  Under this formulation, an injured party cannot 
prove that a prescription drug or medical device is defectively 
designed by showing that a safer alternative was available.252  
Drug A would not be considered defective even though a 
competitor, Drug B, was available and had the same therapeutic 
benefits but had fewer adverse side effects.  Under the Products 
Liability Restatement’s approach, the fact that Drug B was a 
better product would not mean that Drug A should not also be 
marketed. 
Only a few cases have ruled on this provision, and the results 
have been mixed.  A small number of courts have either expressly 
 
246.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d). 
247.  Id. § 6(c) (emphasis added). 
248.  Id. § 6 cmt. b (emphasis added). 
249.  Id. 
250.  Id. 
251.  See generally George W. Conk, The True Test: Alternative Safer Designs for 
Drugs and Medical Devices in a Patent-Constrained Market, 49 UCLA L. REV. 737 (2002). 
252.  See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1089 (2000). 
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adopted section 6(c) or have mentioned it favorably in passing.253  
For example, a federal district court, in Madsen v. American 
Home Products Corp.,254 concluded that Iowa courts would apply 
section 6(c) in a prescription drug design defect case.255  In the 
case, the plaintiff alleged that she had contracted valvular heart 
disease as a result of taking fen-phen for five months.256  She 
claimed, inter alia, that the drug was defectively designed.257  
Granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court 
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to show that no reasonable 
health-care provider would prescribe the drug for any class of 
patients.258 
In contrast, several courts have rejected the approach of 
section 6(c) and instead have elected to retain section 402A’s 
comment k formula.  Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.259  
reflects this view.  The plaintiff in Freeman developed multiple 
health problems after taking the drug Accutane to treat chronic 
acne.260  She brought suit against the drug’s manufacturer, relying 
on various theories of recovery.261  Her design defect claim 
alleged that the risks inherent in the drug’s design outweighed its 
benefits.262  A lower court dismissed her suit, and she appealed.263  
In deciding whether to reinstate the plaintiff’s design defect 
claim, the Nebraska Supreme Court had to choose between the 
comment k and section 6(c) approaches.264  After reviewing some 
of the criticisms that had been made against section 6(c), the 
Nebraska court concluded that “recovery would be nearly 
impossible” under the Product Liability Restatement’s 
approach.265  Instead, the court determined that comment k 
 
253.  See, e.g., Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 185 (D. Ariz. 1999) 
(discussing anti-reflux prosthesis); Wheat v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1361 
n.11 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (discussing a bone-screw device); Sita v. Danek Med. Inc., 43 F. Supp. 
2d 245, 256 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing a bone-screw device). 
254.  477 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (E.D. Mo 2004). 
255.  Id. at 1037. 
256.  Id. at 1028-29. 
257.  Id. at 1029. 
258.  Id. at 1037. 
259.  618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2000).  
260.  Id. at 832. 
261.  Id. 
262.  Id. at 833. 
263.  Id. at 832. 
264.  Freeman, 618 N.W.2d at 840. 
265.  Id. 
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applied to drug-related design defects and held that the plaintiff’s 
design defect claim should go forward on that theory.266 
The Products Liability Restatement’s approach represents a 
tradeoff between drug safety and other concerns.  One such 
concern is the need to protect licensing decisions by the FDA 
from collateral attacks in the form of lawsuits against 
pharmaceutical companies.267  In addition, it is necessary that new 
drugs be developed as quickly as possible so they may be made 
available to the public.268  Although there is some debate about 
the effectiveness of the FDA’s licensing process, there is no doubt 
that the agency has a high degree of expertise in the area of drug 
safety.269  For this reason, the courts have shown considerable 
willingness to shield the FDA’s licensing decisions and 
regulatory policies by preempting certain types of design defect 
and failure-to-warn suits against drug manufacturers.270  
Regulatory compliance statutes in some states also protect FDA 
decision making—albeit less effectively than federal 
preemption.271 
IV.  TRADEOFFS BETWEEN PRODUCT SAFETY AND 
OTHER SOCIETAL OBJECTIVES 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the Product Liability 
Restatement’s risk-utility balancing test allows courts and juries 
to make tradeoffs between product safety and other 
considerations, particularly where product design is at issue.  In 
addition, there are a number of specific doctrines that protect 
manufacturers against liability for the marketing of products that 
may not be optimally safe.  This portion of the article identifies 
some of the societal objectives that compete with, and sometimes 
trump, product safety.  These social goals include personal 
autonomy and consumer choice, product cost and performance, 
 
266.  Id. at 840-41. 
267.  See Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in 
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2165 (2000). 
268.  See Steven Goldberg, Technology Unbound: Will Funded Libertarianism 
Dominate the Future?, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 26 (2007) (“[F]aster access to new 
drugs has been an increasingly popular position for decades.”).  
269.  See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, 
111 YALE L.J. 151, 162 n.41 (2001). 
270.  See Mut. Pharma. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2476-77 (2013).  
271.  See 2 OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 198, § 14.6. 
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the protection of product sellers, and the protection of third 
parties. 
A. Personal Autonomy and Consumer Choice 
1. Personal Autonomy 
The principle of personal autonomy assumes that individuals 
should have the power to make meaningful choices without 
having to justify them to others.272  The moral right to make such 
choices is grounded on the unique capacity of human beings to 
reason and to act according to normative principles.273  Respect 
for the right of personal autonomy is deeply rooted in American 
culture, as well as in American political and legal institutions.274 
Risk-taking is an important aspect of the exercise of personal 
autonomy.275  Risk-seekers are likely to engage in dangerous 
activities such as hang gliding, bungee jumping, skydiving, or 
mountain climbing.  They also prefer to ride motorcycles without 
a helmet in states where this is permitted.  Risk-avoiders, on the 
other hand, prefer to live more sedated, and possibly longer, lives.  
It is important to note, however, that a high tolerance for risk is 
not necessarily based on emotion alone.  In many cases, a risk-
seeker may have a well-founded belief that he or she is better able 
to deal with a particular risk than the average person.276 
Product liability law’s approach to optional safety 
equipment is consistent with consumers’ autonomy-based right to 
voluntarily encounter risks.277  Safety equipment adds to a 
product’s cost and may adversely affect its performance or 
functionality.278  This is particularly true of some of the annoying 
gadgets found on modern automobiles.  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that some consumers would prefer to do without these 
features, even though the resulting product is more dangerous 
 
272.  See Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 385, 395 (1996). 
273.  See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW 8 (1982).  
274.  See Berger, supra note 5, at 26. 
275.  See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Value of Consumer Choice in Products Liability, 74 
BROOK. L. REV. 781, 782 (2009); see also Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and 
Private Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation 
Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 372 (2006). 
276.  See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 175, at 1321.  
277.  Ausness, supra note 147, at 823.  
278.  Geistfeld, supra note 275, at 786.  
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than it would otherwise be.279  Safety is literally optional to the 
extent that manufacturers are allowed to offer safety features as 
optional, rather than as standard equipment.  In the case of 
ordinary consumer products, the primary justifications for this 
rule are personal autonomy and consumer choice.280  Just as 
individuals are permitted to engage in risky activities, within 
reason they are allowed to embrace danger by declining to 
purchase safer products.  Personal autonomy is an important 
interest and the rules concerning optional equipment support this 
interest by permitting manufacturers to make safety optional as 
long as they fully disclose to consumers the risks and choices that 
are available. 
The principle of personal autonomy also guides the law’s 
treatment of inherently dangerous products.  Many of these 
products such as cigarettes, fast food, alcoholic beverages, 
trampolines, all-terrain vehicles, hang-gliders, and above-ground 
swimming pools are not essential to human welfare.  
Nevertheless, despite their dangerous character, the principle of 
personal autonomy suggests that people should be free to 
purchase them and manufacturers should not held liable for 
placing these products into the stream of commerce.281  Clearly, 
society values, or at least tolerates, the public’s right to consume 
or utilize inherently dangerous products and thereby expose 
themselves to the unavoidable risks associated with them. 
Finally, personal autonomy may also support imposing a 
negligence standard on used product sellers instead of subjecting 
them to strict liability.  If strict liability were imposed on used 
product sellers, their products would be safer, but more 
expensive, because of the additional measures the seller would 
have to take in order to avoid liability.282  On the other hand, 
imposing a negligence standard on these sellers allows them to 
sell their goods more cheaply.283  This in turn enables those 
consumers who are willing to accept greater risk to purchase a 
used product instead of paying more for a new, safer one.  In other 
 
279.  See id. at 797.  
280.  See id. at 798.  
281.  Of course, manufacturers may be liable to injured consumers if they are guilty of 
fraud or failure to warn, or if they engage in unethical marketing practices. 
282.  See Antonio J. Senagore, The Benefits of Limiting Strict Liability for Used-
Product Sellers, 30 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 349, 373 (2010). 
283.  Id. at 378.  
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words, consumers can subject themselves to a greater risk of 
injury in order to have more money to spend on other things. 
2. Consumer Choice 
Consumer choice is closely related to personal autonomy 
because the right to make choices is illusory if there are no 
meaningful choices available.284  However, consumer choice can 
also be justified on utilitarian grounds.  In order for individuals to 
allocate resources in a way that maximizes their utility, they must 
be able to choose from a wide variety of goods and services.285  
Producers respond to this demand from consumers by offering a 
range of products that vary significantly in terms of quality, 
appearance, performance, convenience, and safety.  It follows, 
therefore, that some products will be safer than others.  Motor 
vehicles provide a good example of this phenomenon.  Low-end 
vehicles typically have fewer safety features than more expensive 
ones, yet consumers still choose to purchase them.286  On the 
other hand, risk-adverse individuals are free to purchase a more 
expensive model that is equipped with such safety devices as anti-
lock brakes, rearview cameras, side airbags, blind-spot monitors, 
and the like.287 
Consumer choice may also support the view that consumers 
should have access to inherently dangerous products, even when 
safer alternatives are available.  An obvious example of this is 
food and drink.  Consumers can choose to eat healthy foods, such 
as lean meats, whole-grain products, and fruits and vegetables, or 
they can choose to consume tasty, but less healthy, fare, such as 
hamburgers, chili dogs, pizza, and sugary soft drinks.  Perhaps the 
same is true of alcoholic beverages, although some might say that 
iced tea is a poor substitute for a dry martini.  In any event, the 
consumer-choice rationale supports consumers’ right to choose 
 
284.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1998) 
(noting the drafters of the Products Liability Restatement approved of consumer choice in 
considering the defective design of products).  
285.  See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and 
Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (1980). 
286.  See Geistfeld, supra note 21, at 123.  
287.  See Pierce, supra note 285, at 1283.  By the same token, risk-adverse consumers 
may prefer to pay for safety features that are not cost-effective from a risk-utility point of 
view.  In the case of big-ticket items like automobiles, there may be a niche market for ultra-
safe models for this class of consumers.  Wealthy, older consumers are likely a prime 
demographic for this apparent over-investment in product safety. 
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whatever products they want, not just products that are good for 
them. 
The practice of allowing manufacturers to offer some forms 
of safety equipment on an optional basis also ensures that 
products will be available to a wide range of consumers.  Many 
of these consumers consider some safety features to be 
unnecessary, inconvenient, or too expensive.  Providing safety 
features as optional, rather than standard, equipment allows 
consumers to decide which safety features they want or do not 
want, depending upon their intended use of the product.  Finally, 
the imposition of a negligence standard, instead of strict liability, 
on the sellers of used products, enables them to sell their goods 
more cheaply.  This provides consumers with more choices by 
enabling them to purchase cheaper, but less safe, used products if 
they prefer to do so. 
B. Product Cost and Performance 
Many of the doctrines discussed above subordinate product 
safety to some degree in order to achieve lower product cost or 
better product performance.  Product “cost,” in this context, refers 
to the price that a retail consumer must pay to purchase a 
particular product.  If manufacturers try to achieve greater product 
safety by equipping their products with safety devices, either 
because they are required to do so by government regulation or to 
avoid potential tort liability, they will have to charge more for 
these products. 
Although public policy may support higher prices, in order 
to lower consumption of some products, such as cigarettes, in 
most cases it is preferable that prices of consumer goods be lower 
rather than higher.  There are several reasons that society prefers 
lower-cost goods.  First, if product prices are relatively high, 
poorer consumers will not be able to afford them.  Excessively 
high prices for food and other necessities can cause serious social 
unrest.  Second, in a consumption-oriented economy, the nation’s 
economic prosperity is dependent on maintaining a healthy level 
of public consumption.  Finally, if safety costs increase the price 
of a product, consumers may turn to cheaper, but more dangerous, 
substitutes.288 
 
288.  See Henderson, supra note 195, at 1040 (noting this tendency).  
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Increased safety may also affect product availability.  When 
a certain level of safety is required by government regulation or 
by tort law, manufacturers may simply get out of the market and 
turn to the production of other products.  This apparently occurred 
some years ago with childhood vaccines289 and general aviation 
aircraft.290  In both cases, Congress felt compelled to pass 
legislation encouraging manufacturers to produce these products 
again.291 
 Sometimes tradeoffs must also be made between product 
safety and product performance.  Product performance is 
concerned with how well a product performs its intended 
function.  It includes such considerations as efficiency of 
operation, costs of maintenance and operation, reliability, 
durability, convenience, and even aesthetics.  However, some 
safety devices significantly impair product performance, such as 
safety guards on punch presses, radial power saws, or similar 
products.  Likewise, roll-over protection devices and seat belts 
may also adversely affect the performance and versatility of 
products such as forklifts, tractors, and farm equipment. 
The contract specification defense encourages better product 
performance by enabling purchasers to obtain custom-designed 
products without having to accept features, including safety 
features, they do not want.  This not only increases the number of 
possible options available to purchasers, but it also allows them 
to decide how much safety they want.  Thus, the appropriate level 
of safety, at least in the case of custom-designed products, is left 
to the discretion of consumers rather than this being imposed 
upon them by others.  Economic efficiency may also provide 
some support for the contract specification doctrine because it 
enables purchasers with superior risk-avoidance skills to avoid 
having to pay for safety devices that they do not need. 
 
289.  See Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in the National Childhood Vaccine 
Injury Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 351 (2011). 
290.  See Scott David Smith, Note, The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994: 
The Initial Necessity for, Outright Success of, and Continued Need for the Act to Maintain 
American General Aviation Predominance Throughout the World, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 75, 77-78 (2009). 
291.  See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-2 to -33 
(2012); General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1994) (amended 
1997). 
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C. The Protection of Significant Governmental Policies 
and Interests 
In some instances, product safety must be balanced against 
important governmental policies and interests.  These policies and 
interests are typically expressed or implied in either federal 
statutes or agency regulations.  For example, statutes and 
regulations may be enacted in order to impose a uniform 
regulatory standard throughout the country.  This approach often 
reflects a view by Congress or a federal regulatory agency that the 
economic or administrative benefits of uniform regulatory 
standards outweigh the marginal benefits of any stricter safety 
requirements that may be imposed under state law.  For example, 
in Cipollone,292 the United States Supreme Court declared that 
one of the objectives of the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act was to “protect[] the national economy from the 
burden imposed by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette 
labeling and advertising regulations.”293  Thus, the Court 
concluded that the states could not impose stricter labeling 
requirements, either by direct regulation or by judicial decision, 
on cigarette manufacturers.294 
Another important regulatory goal is the protection of 
agency decision-making from second-guessing by juries.  This 
issue has arisen on several occasions in connection with the 
FDA’s approval of particular warning language on prescription 
drug labeling.  For example, in Wyeth v. Levine,295 the defendant 
drug company argued that the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim 
should be preempted on actual conflict grounds because Congress 
intended “to entrust an expert agency to make drug labeling 
decisions that strike a balance between competing objectives.”296  
Although the Court rejected this argument in Wyeth, it has shown 
a greater willingness to protect the FDA’s decision-making 
process in other cases.297 
The courts have also acknowledged the need to protect the 
federal government’s design decisions against collateral attacks 
 
292.  Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).  
293.  Id. at 514. 
294.  See id. at 524. 
295.  555 U.S. 555 (2009).   
296.  Id. at 573. 
297.  See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2480 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. 
v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2582 (2011). 
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by injured military personnel and others.  Thus, in Boyle,298 the 
Court invoked the government contractor defense to shield the 
manufacturer of a helicopter from tort liability when its design 
had been dictated by procurement officials to meet specific 
military needs, even though a safer design was possible.299  In the 
case, the Court expressed concern that manufacturers of military 
hardware might be deterred from contracting with the government 
out of fear that they would be subject to damage claims from 
injured military personnel.300 
A fourth federal interest is that of protecting particular 
economic activities or geographic areas of the country from the 
adverse effects of aggressive state regulatory action, including the 
imposition of tort liability on product sellers.  This principle was 
reflected in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 
with which the Cipollone majority balanced the public-health 
objectives against the goal of protecting the tobacco industry and 
the economic interests of tobacco-producing states from stricter 
regulation of cigarette labeling by other jurisdictions.301  
Congress was evidently motivated by similar concerns, as the 
Court noted in Geier,302 when it concluded that a DOT regulation 
that mandated the gradual introduction of airbags preempted a 
“no airbag” claim against a car manufacturer by an injured 
consumer.303 
Finally, the federal government may need to protect its own 
financial interests at the expense of greater product safety.  At 
least one doctrine, although nominally aimed at protecting 
product sellers, is actually intended to protect the interests of the 
federal government, albeit indirectly.  The doctrine in question is 
the government contractor defense.  When the government 
formulates designs and specifications for a product, it is usually 
not liable to injured parties because of its sovereign immunity.304  
However, as the United States Supreme Court pointed out in 
Boyle, the government will be indirectly liable if an accident 
 
298.  Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
299.  Id. at 503, 512.  The Court remanded the case to the appellate court for a 
clarification as to whether the evidence would support a verdict in favor of the defendant 
since the government contractor defense applied.  Id. at 513-14.  
300.  See id. at 507. 
301.  See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 513-14 (1992). 
302. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
303.  Id. at 886. 
304.  See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.  
2014] DANGER IS MY BUSINESS 869 
victim can sue its contractor, since the contractor will take its 
potential tort liability into account when it bids on a contract.305  
The government contractor defense enables the government to 
sacrifice safety for other objectives without having to pay more 
for the products that it orders from private contractors.306  This is 
particularly significant in military procurement cases because the 
federal government must often balance safety against cost or 
military effectiveness when it develops designs for products to 
meet its military needs.307 
D. Protection of Product Sellers 
A number of doctrines are intended to provide manufacturers 
and other product sellers with a safe harbor against claims that 
their products are not optimally safe.  These include federal 
preemption, the contract specification doctrine, and the regulatory 
compliance doctrine.  One reason to protect product sellers is that 
massive tort liability may bankrupt them, causing harm to 
employees, shareholders, creditors, and the communities where 
these products were produced. The experience of the asbestos 
industry showed that this risk is not illusory.308  The economic 
influence of other industries makes them “too big to fail” and, 
therefore, arguably justifies the creation of doctrines that limit 
their liability for the sale of products that may be sub-optimally 
safe.  Cigarette companies, firearms manufacturers, and 
purveyors of fast food are examples of such industries.  Finally, 
courts or legislatures may want to protect product sellers to ensure 
the availability of essential and highly beneficial products.  The 
special treatment accorded by the Products Liability Restatement 
to vaccines and prescription drugs reflects this policy.309 
 
 
305.  Id. at 511-12. 
306.  See Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1075, 1093 (1996). 
307.  See, e.g., Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 364 A.2d 43, 47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1976) (deferring to the Army’s judgment that seat belts on a vehicle would interfere with its 
combat effectiveness). 
308.  See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Asbestos Litigation and Bankruptcy: A Case Study for 
Ad Hoc Public Policy Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 203, 210 
(2003). 
309.   See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998).  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The aforementioned doctrines and defenses reflect 
compromises between optional safety and other interests.  In most 
cases, these compromises appear to be fully justified.  
Nevertheless, sometimes it might be possible to tweak them a bit 
to improve the level of product safety without interfering with 
other important societal interests.  For example, if the courts wish 
to shift the balance in favor of product safety in the case of federal 
preemption, they could treat the “presumption against 
preemption”310 as a clear-statement rule and refuse to find 
preemption unless Congress makes its intent to preempt clear.311  
This would lead to fewer products liability cases being 
preempted, thereby arguably increasing product safety. 
By protecting a manufacturer from liability, the contract 
specification defense provides more leeway to the purchaser to 
obtain the design features he or she wants.312  However, it also 
creates an externality problem when others, such as employees of 
the purchaser, are forced to bear the risks associated with unsafe 
designs.  One solution would be to modify the exclusive- remedy 
rule of workers’ compensation law and allow injured workers to 
recover against their employers in cases where design 
specifications provided by the employer are substantially unsafe.  
A similar negative externality problem exists when employers 
purchase off-the-shelf equipment for commercial use.  When 
safety equipment is optional, employers may be tempted to save 
money by declining to purchase safety equipment because they 
are not exposed to risks associated with placing dangerous 
products in the workplace.  Yet again, the solution may be to 
restrict the exclusive-remedy rule in such cases. 
Turning to the government contractor defense, the 
requirements set forth in Boyle for that doctrine provide a fair 
degree of assurance that government officials will consciously 
 
        310. The presumption against preemption states that the states’ historic police powers 
should not be superseded by federal legislation unless Congress expresses a clear and 
manifest purpose to do so.  See Mary J. Davis, The “New” Presumption Against Preemption, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1219 (2010). 
311.  See Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety 
Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J. 913, 971 
(2004); Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption that Never Was: Pre-emption 
Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379, 1429 (1998). 
312.  See Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co., 221 F. Supp. 129, 133-34 (N.D. Ind. 1963). 
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balance safety considerations against other national interests.313  
Nevertheless, a higher level of safety might be achieved if the 
defense was limited to the procurement of military equipment and 
not applied to products that are not specifically designed for 
military use.  Of course, this would require the United States 
Supreme Court to reconsider the Boyle decision and shift the 
rationale of the government contractor defense from the 
discretionary function doctrine to the Feres rule.314 
In addition, courts could change the obvious hazard rule 
from a “no duty” rule to one that raises a presumption that a 
warning is not required in obvious hazard situations.  Plaintiffs 
could then overcome this presumption by proving the existence 
of special circumstances.  In the case of used products, it would 
be useful for state legislatures or administrative agencies to 
impose a duty to inspect safety equipment, such as brakes, on 
certain products. 
Due to the heavily regulated nature of prescription drugs and 
medical devices, tort law can probably do little to increase the 
safety of these products without unduly infringing upon the 
FDA’s regulatory authority.  However, it may be possible to 
increase product safety by expediting and simplifying the process 
of strengthening warning labels in response to new information 
about product risks that arises after a drug or medical device is 
approved for marketing by the FDA.  In addition, the FDA could 
require the producers of generic drugs to update their labeling in 
response to new information about side effects or other product-
related risks. 
In conclusion, various doctrines and defenses protect 
manufacturers from liability even though their products are not 
particularly safe.  While this state of affairs would seem to be at 
odds with the safety goals of modern products liability law, it may 
in fact be defensible.  Safety is a desirable objective, but it is not 
necessarily an absolute priority.  Instead, other values and 
objectives, such as personal autonomy and consumer choice, 
product cost, and product performance may trump safety goals.  
 
313.  See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).  
314.  See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).  The Court in Feres held 
that military personnel could not sue the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act for service-related injuries.  Id.; see also Ausness, supra note 126, at 990-91 (discussing 
the rule).  
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Nevertheless, it may be possible to adjust some of these doctrines 
and defenses slightly to enhance consumer protection. 
 
 
